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INDIAN RIGHTS: 25 U.S.C. § 71:
THE END OF INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY OR
A SELF-LIMITATION OF CONTRACTUAL ABILITY?
George William Rice
Due to the interpretation of the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution,' the exclusive powers of the federal govern-
ment to regulate its relations with Indian nations have never been
successfully challenged.' However, the precise basis of congres-
sional power to regulate Indian internal affairs has not been
defined by the courts,3 although they generally assume the power
exists.'
Prior to the Act of March 3, 1871,' 666 treaties with Indian
tribes appear in the statutes. Although some commentators have
expressed the opinion that treaties were used in lieu of the "normal
legislative process,"' Indian legislation in Congress prior to 1871
was passed pursuant to either the commerce clause or ratified
treaties! The vast majority of this legislation was appropriations
acts to fulfill treaty obligations.! The validity of Indian treaties be-
ing clearly established as a matter of law,'" presumably legislation
based on these treaties that allows Congress to regulate specified
internal tribal affairs would be valid. However, in extending con-
gressional authority to interfere with internal tribal government
without Indian consent, the courts have generally resorted to a
multi-inferentialistic approach," ranging from theories such as
economic" and military dependence,' 3 and doctrines such as
conquest," wardship,'5 and plenary powers,'6 to statutes such as
Section 71 of Title 25 of the United States Code (hereafter referred
to as just Section 71)."
In view of the tremendous complexity required for any analysis
of such a multi-inferential approach, it may be helpful to attempt
an in-depth analysis of one specific portion of the Court's reason-
ing. With this in mind, Section 71," which is often cited as part of
the reasoning allowing such congressional intrusion into internal
tribal affairs,'9 will be considered.
Legislative Origins
Section 71 of Title 25 resulted from opposition of the House of
Representatives to its practical exclusion from any policy-making
role in Indian affairs." For nearly a century the executive branch
made treaty arrangements with Indians "by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate."'" Although the House appropriated
monies to carry out the treaty provisions, it had no voice in the
development of substantive Indian policy." This resentment
resulted in an 1867 act presaging the termination of the treaty-
making period. The pertinent section of the act provided:
And all laws allowing the President, the Secretary of the In-
terior, or the Commissioner of Indian affairs to enter into
treaties with any Indian tribes are hereby repealed, and no
expense shall hereinafter be incurred in negotiating a treaty
with any Indian tribe until an appropriation authorizing such
expense shall be first made by law.Y
However, this provision, being one of several abortive attempts to
end Indian treaty-making,2' was repealed a few months later.
In concert with attacks by the Indian Bureau administration26
and frontier senators,2 7 the strong fight by the House made it evi-
dent by 1871 that the treaty system had reached its end. 2 The In-
dian appropriation act for the fiscal year 1872, approved on
March 3, 1871, contained the following clause, added to a
sentence making an appropriation for the Yankton Indians:
Provided, That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power with
whom the United States may contract by treaty: Provided
further, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to
invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore
lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or
tribe. 12
Judicial Use and Interpretation
The Federal District Courts, in affirming congressional license
to interfere with tribal affairs, have continuously relied on ex-
tralegal reasoning and partial quotation of Section 71 °.3 For exam-
ple, in United States v. Blackfeet Tribe, the Court stated the
blunt fact that an Indian tribe could exercise only those sovereign
powers that the United States allowed.2 While for many years
treaties had been used to deal with Indian tribes, and some
elements of sovereignty were recognized, Congress had prohibited
the further recognition of Indian tribes as independent nations
through Section 71.'
The difference between the implications of the Act as used and
the Act as written are readily apparent. As used, Indian tribes or
nations are no longer recognized as political entities to any degree
other than that which the Congress specifically determines.
However, as written, the Act simply changes the method of mak-
ing arrangements between political entities.'
The Supreme Court appears to have gone full circle in its inter-
pretation of Section 71. In 1872, shortly after passage of the
statute, the Court was again called upon to determine the status of
the Cherokee Nation in Holden v. Joy. While recognizing the
domestic dependent nation status expressed in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,3 6 the Court further stated that the Cherokees were
recognized as a people capable of maintaining the relations of
peace and war," and of being politically responsible for aggres-
sions by their people committed on citizens of the United States.3 8
The Court felt that the actions of the legislative and executive
branches throughout the history of the United States had plainly
recognized the Indian tribal nations as states39 and decided that
they were bound by those actions."0
In 1876, in yet another appropriation act,' Congress specifically
provided for agreements to be made between the President and the
Sioux Indians.'" The appropriation act was coupled with a proviso
declaring that no further monies would be appropriated for sub-
sistence of the Sioux until an agreement was entered into by the
Sioux with the President of the United States outlining terms for
cession of the Black Hills.'3 In Exparte Crow Dog," construing the
status of an agreement which was made and ratified in part by an
act of Congress,'5 the Court declared that its ratification by
statute, instead of as a treaty, was in accordance with the policy
declared in Section 71.6
Only a year later in the Indian voting rights case of Elk v.
Wilkins,'7 the Court made an even stronger statement as to the ef-
fect of Section 71. The Court pointed out that the utmost effect of
this section was to require agreements with Indian tribes to be
ratified through legislative power and not treaty-making power.'"
Thereafter the Court proceeded to deny an Indian's voting rights,
even though he had fulfilled all of the conditions necessary under
his people's treaty.' 9 Here, thirteen years after passage of Section
71, is a definitive statement that the utmost effect of the statute
was a change in the method of the United States' ratification of an
agreement between two international bodies politicM
However strongly the alien or foreign status of Indian tribes was
expressed by a Court denying an Indian person voting rights
under the United States legal system,"' when an Indian challenged
the assumption of jurisdiction in a criminal case, the Court readily
upheld jurisdiction.' Only two years after the decision in Elk, 3 the
Court in United States v. Kagama" upheld the assumption of a
criminal jurisdiction by the United States over Indian land,
asserting that within the geographical limits of the United States
there were only two political powers, the government of the
United States and the states of the Union." It should be noted that
the Court did not cite or overrule Elk' on the jurisdictional
question"' when it decided that Section 71 was an expression of a
new congressional intent to govern Indians by acts of Congress.'
In referring to Crow Dog,' the Court stated that the agreement
was supposed to extend over the Sioux people the laws of the
United States and the jurisdiction of its courts.' The Court further
pointed out that the decision in Crow Dog admitted that if the in-
tention of Congress had been for the courts to punish the murder
of one Indian by another, the law would have been valid." The
Court could not see, however, in the agreement with the Indians
sanctioned by Congress, a purpose to repeal Section 2146 of the
Revised Statutes. This section expressly excludes from that
jurisdiction the case of a crime committed by an Indian against
another in the Indian country.6 ' By approving the unilateral ex-
tension of jurisdiction in this instance, thee Court may have lost
sight of two vital factors due to its interpretation of Section 71.
First, whatever the suppositions of the Court as to the intended ef-
fect of the agreement, it did not explicitly extend to the United
States' criminal jurisdiction.' Second, the Court's statement, "Illf
the intention of Congress had been to punish.., the law would
have been valid,"" avoids the substance of the agreement making
process. In substance, an agreement was a treaty between the
federal government and an Indian tribe' with only the manner of
ratification by the federal government being changed." Thus,
agreement making depends on the will of both parties," and either
the United States or an Indian tribe may and frequently has
refused to make treaties or pacts which the other has desired."
Kagama" begins a period of uncertainty in the judicial inter-
pretation of Section 71. Cases prior to Kagama held that the
statute did no more than change the method of contracting and
did not affect the political status of Indians." In Kagama, the
Court first used the statute as one of its many bases for denying In-
dian political control over Indian land."
Quickly expanding the ruling produced by Kagama, the Court
in Choctaw Nation v. United States7 went on to decide that Sec-
tion 71 allowed Congress to unilaterally extend legislative authori-
ty to Indian land. 7 Also, that Congress was determined to extend
its legislative power over Indian land and had made the Choctaws,
in their "peculiar relationship to the United States,"'74 subject to the
power and authority of the laws of the United States.7' In 1890,
this opinion was quoted with favor in Cherokee Nation v. Kansas
Railway Co.76 This decision allowed the United States to grant a
railroad easement through the Cherokee country over the protests
of the Cherokees and their fee simple title, which was acquired by
the treaty of Fort Gibson, February 14, 1833.77
By 1898, the statute was interpreted in New York Indians v.
United States7" as a general law that denied the right of any Indian
tribe or nation to be recognized as an independent nation for
treaty-making purposes.79 In 1902, the Court again authorized
unilateral legislative control via Section 71,' stating that the inten-
tion Congress expressed there was to make Indian tribes directly
amenable to the laws of the United States by the immediate exer-
cise of congressional legislative power."' A change of position oc-
curred again in 1903 when Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock" decided that
legislative action to ratify federal government-Indian agreements
was the consequence of the policy expressed in Section 71.8
Two years later, a return to the problems presented in Kagama
4
was evidenced when the Court, in the case of In re HeftP stated
that Indians were not to be dealt with as separate nations after
1871. Thereafter Indians were subject to the direct legislation of
Congress.' Between 1913 and 1962, three cases involving this
statute produced conflicting interpretations. '
In 1975, a jurisdictional struggle developed between the United
States and the state of Washington in Antoine v. Washington."
While Washington claimed the right to regulate hunting practices
on land ceded by the Indians to the United States, the federal
government claimed jurisdiction to determine the hunting rights of
the Indians on that land."0 There was no question of tribal jurisdic-
tion, and the Court held that as Section 71 did no more or no less
than change the method of the ratification procedures incumbent
on the federal government, the agreement, like all treaties made,
became the law of the land. 1
The situation in DeCoteau v. District County Court,2 also
decided in 1975, is somewhat different. Here the jurisdictional
dispute arose between South Dakota and the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Sioux. 3 Even though the tribal constitution and the tribal code,
both approved by the Secretary of the Interior, expressly assumed
complete jurisdiction 4 and a tribal resolution expressly provided
for tribal control of adoption cases,95 the Court refused to allow
that jurisdiction on nontrust land subject to non-Indian
occupancy.9 Notwithstanding the acknowledgement of Kagama7
expressed in the dissent that the people of a state surrounding a
reservation were among the Indians' deadliest enemies," the Court
proceeded to justify its interpretation of the agreement by "quotes
of tribal spokesmen" in the local press.99 Using Section 71 to deny
international status to Indians and approve the authority of Con-
gress to regulate Indian affairs through statute,' ® the authority of
Congress and the President to implement the General Allotment
Act of 188701 was unquestioned.'" The dissent, however, felt that
the duress under which the agreement was consummated and the
insufficiency of the termination language was not well treated by
the majority."
So it developed that 103 years after the first Supreme Court in-
terpretation of Section 71 of Title 25 of the United States Code and
86 years after the dual blows to Indian sovereignty of Kagama"4
and Choctaw Nation," the Court cited Section 71 twice in the
same year.'" These two decisions are indicative of the manner in
which this statute has been used since its passage. In Antoine,'"
the legislative history of the Act is considered in concluding that
acts of Congress now ratify agreements with Indians."' This was
the utmost meaning of Section 71,"' and such agreements are the
law of the land and binding upon the states, notwithstanding the
state not being a party to the agreement."' However, less than two
weeks later in DeCoteau,"' the Court again cited Section 71 in
part, stating: "after 1871, the tribes were no longer regarded as
sovereign nations, and the Government began to regulate their af-
fairs through statute or through contractual agreements ratified by
statute."" As usual in the cases of partial quotation, this was a
part of the "historical background"' 1" used by the Court when ra-
tionalizing a decision limiting Indian jurisdiction.
In both cases, an agreement was made after 1871 between the
Indians involved and the United States government ceding reser-
vation land."' A jurisdictional question arose regarding the ceded
land"' and the validity of the agreement making process was
unanimously approved."'1 While both cases involved the question
of extension of state jurisdiction over the ceded portion of the
reservation,"' the distinction in the use of Section 71 may have
arisen over the political question of jurisdiction claimed by the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux."'
Thus, in two similar cases, two distinct uses are made of the
same statute. Antoine,"" in upholding federal jurisdiction over In-
dians, treats Section 71 at length and incorporates it in the holding
of the Court.20 DeCoteau,"' decided less than two weeks later,
uses the section as obiter dicta in a method clearly contrary to its
prior holding in Antoine' to deny Indian jurisdiction over
Indians.Y3 No change of the personnel of the Court or great
philosophical changes in attitude can account for this change of
usage. The Court generally determines, in its use of the statute as
dicta, that it is an expression of Congress that Indian tribes are no
longer considered as nations.12' The Court's attempts to judge the
legislative intent on questions of tribal status have not produced
consistent results.'" An example of the problems encountered in
this area can be seen in the cases of In re Heft' and United States
v. Nice. 7 In Heff," after stating that since 1871 Indians had been
subjected to the direct authority of Congress, the Court decided
that the allotment acts had terminated the wardship status of In-
dians with the granting of United States citizenship. '29 However,
the Court was later forced to overrule Hef&O when it became clear
that notwithstanding allotments and citizenship, both Congress
and the administrative officers of the government had proceeded
on the theory that the tribal relations and wardship status had not
been disturbed.131
Nonjudicial Recognition of Sovereign Powers
Assuming, arguendo, that after 1871, Congress no longer con-
sidered Indians to be nations subject only to the superior power of
the United States to force its will upon them, but considered them
to possess none of the indicia of sovereignty, would the subse-
quent actions of Congress and the Executive be consistent with
this policy7 While statutes have been enacted that encroach on
tribal sovereignty,'32 the stance of the executive and legislative
branches held Indian nations to the highest concept of duty
between nations under the rules of international law.'33 The ex-
ecutive branch has historically resorted to use of the armed forces
to control "uprisings" occurring in Indian country.'4 The army
held some tribes as prisoners of war into the 1900's'3 and justified
the killing of members of those tribes as attempts to prevent
escapes by prisoners of war as late as 1906.36 Conversely, it ap-
pears that the killing of Americans by tribal members not in amity
with the United States was an act of war and not punishable by
domestic laws.'37 Congress, by specifically providing for United
States actions if a state of war arises with an Indian tribe,' 8 has
recognized the power of Indians to make war until the present
time.13 This recognition has had definite consequences for both the
Indian and non-Indian in the adjudication of actions which would
have been murder or manslaughter under domestic law."14
Passport requirements to enter Indian country were not lifted
until 1934,"' and Congress has passed statutes which subject In-
dian nations to the standards of international law. "2 Furthermore,
listed among the reasons for the United States' continuing involve-
ment in the Inter-American Institute was: "4. Nonparticipation in
the Institute might provoke the accusation by organized Indian
groups in this country, such as the National Congress of American
Indians, that the United States is neglecting its international
obligations toward the Indian.""3
Thus, while Congress passes statutes interfering with internal
tribal sovereignty,"' and the courts continue to declare that Indian
nations no longer exist as nations, 5 the same Congress and courts
continue to hold Indians to a standard of international conduct."6
In fact, Congress and the courts have held Indian nations to the
highest concept of reparations shared by independent nations
under the law of treaties. This inconsistency has never been ade-
quately explained.17
Constitutionality
The constitutionality of Section 71 has not been challenged and
some questions may be raised as to its validity."' Whether Con-
gress, a nontreaty-making division of the government, has the
power to place a binding limitation upon the treaty-making
power, viz., the President and the Senate,"'9 and whether a treaty
made with an Indian tribe next year and constitutionally ratified
would be valid or invalid, are questions which have not been ad-
dressed by the courts.' °
However, the Supreme Court has stated that if Congress adopts
a policy conflicting with the Constitution of the United States, it is
then acting beyond its authority and the Court must declare the
resulting statute null and void.'-' Thus it would follow that if Con-
gress does not have the power to limit the treaty-making
authorities, this statute must be null and void on its face.' 2
Conclusion
A return to the treaty method of interactions between the
United States and Indian nations is a matter of great concern
among traditional Indian people today.'3 The reasons for this con-
cern are perhaps best expressed by the Institute for the Develop-
ment of Indian Law:
Perhaps the basic contention of American Indians today with
respect to their treaty rights is not that treaties cannot be
repealed, abrogated, or superseded (by either party), but that
they are not given the dignity which such legal agreements
should receive. The United States is deadly serious when
speaking of the land cessions made by the tribes under the
treaties. When it comes to fulfilling the duties of the United
States under the same treaties, however, we are told that the
treaties are either old, have been superseded by subsequent
legislation or that they do not mean what they plainly say.4
When Congress condemned the use of treaties, it did not pre-
vent the practice of dealing with Indian nations by means of
"constitutions," "agreements," "charters," and "conventions,"'5
nor impair the validity of any existing treaty,'" nor impair the
political status of Indian governments.'' The only difference in
these allowable types of agreements and treaties is that agreements
are ratified by both Houses of Congress instead of by the Senate
alone.'" From the standpoint of the Indian nations, it made little
difference what manner of ratification and procedure was incum-
bent upon the representative of the United States who dealt with
them. 9 There was no change in the legal effect of such
agreements,"w and there is no reason Indian nations cannot make
agreements with the United States of today.'"
Section 71 of Title 25 of the United States Code did not destroy
or decrease the political status of the Indian nations'62 and did not
express a congressional intent that tribal governments were
dissolved or weakened.'" If constitutional, it served only to limit
the United States in the manner in which it could deal with Indian
nations.'"
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